|Order No. & Date
|M/S RADHA KRISHAN INDUSTRIES
|PROVISIONAL ATTACHMENT TO PROTECT REVENUE
|FACTS OF THE CASE:
Provisional attachment was ordered against appellant while invoking section 83 of Himachal Pradesh Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 and rule 159 of the HPGST Rules, 2017
Appellant instituted Writ Petition under article 226 of Constitution challenging orders of provisional attachment.
High Court dismissed writ petition on ground that provisional attachment could not be challenged in a petition under article 226 on ground that an 'alternative and efficacious remedy' of an appeal under section 107 was available.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether the orders of provisional attachment issued by the third respondent against the appellant on 28 October 2020 are in consonance with the conditions stipulated in Section 83 of the HPGST Act?
|GIB/DL/COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX/06.04.2021/SC-23
|DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & ANR.
|FACTS AND ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Pepsi Foods Ltd. (“the Respondent”) is an Indian Company and engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of concentrates, fruit juices, processing of rice and trading of goods for exports.
On September 30, 2008, a return of income was filed for the Assessment Year 2008-2009 declaring a total income of Rs. 92,54,89,822/-. A final assessment order was passed on October 19, 2010 (“Impugned Order”) which was adverse to the Respondent. Aggrieved by the Impugned order, the Respondent filed an appeal before the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal (“ITAT”) on April 29, 2013. On May 31, 2013, ITAT stayed the operation of the Impugned order for a period of six months. Further, the stay was extended till January 8, 2014 and continued being extended until May 28, 2014.
Since the period of 365 days as provided in Section 254(2A) of the IT Act was to end on May 30, 2014, beyond which no further extension could be granted, the Respondent, apprehending coercive action from the Revenue (“the Petitioner”), filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court on May 21, 2014 challenging the constitutional validity of the third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the IT Act. By a judgment dated May 19, 2015, the Delhi High Court struck down a part of the third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the IT Act which did not permit the extension of a stay order beyond 365 days even if the assessee was not responsible for delay in hearing the appeal.
Whether automatic vacation of stay granted by ITAT after expiry of 365 days even if the assessee is not responsible for delay in hearing the appeal is unconstitutional in the eyes of law?
|FACTS AND ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, seeks the permission of the Court to withdraw the petitions with liberty to move the High Court in appropriate proceedings.
Invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, the reliefs have been sought by the petitioners in these proceedings namely, Powers of inspection, search, seizure and arrest - penalties and prosecution - validity of section 69 &132, section 70(1), section 67(1) and 69, Section 137 and section 135 of GST - right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.
|GIB/DL/SKILL LOTTO SOULUTIONS/03.12.2020/SC-26
|SKILL LOTTO SOULUTIONS PVT.
|LEVY OF TAX
|FACT AND ISSUE OF THE CASE:
The petitioner, an authorized agent, for sale and distribution of lotteries organized by State of Punjab has filed this writ petition impugning the definition of goods under Section 2(52) of Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and consequential notifications to the extent it levies tax on lotteries. The petitioner seeks declaration that the levy of tax on lottery is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India.
|GIB/DL/Skill Lotto Solutions (P.) Ltd./03.12.2020/SC-21
|Skill Lotto Solutions (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India
|Fact & Issues Involved:
The petitioner, Skill Lotto Solutions (P.) Ltd. , an authorized agent, for sale and distribution of lotteries organized by the State of Punjab, filed the writ petition impugning the definition of goods under Section 2(52) of Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (‘CGST Act’) and consequential notification to the extent it levies tax on lotteries. The Supreme Court observed that inclusion of actionable claim in the definition of ‘goods’ as given in Section 2(52) of Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is not contrary to the legal meaning of goods.
|L.R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise
|Issues & Facts of The Case-
The Court was hearing an appeal from a CESTAT order whereby the customs duty levied upon the appellant on the sale of cut flowers within the Domestic Tariff Area had been confirmed by the Tribunal.
Appellant is a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) engaged in production of cut flowers and flower buds of all kinds, suitable for bouquets and for ornamental purposes. The 100% EOU is required to export all articles produced by it. As a consequence whereof, it is exempted from payment of customs duty on the imported inputs used during production of the exported articles, vide Notification No. 126/94 Cus dated 3.6.19944. Under the said notification, exemption on levy of customs duty had been extended even to the inputs used in production of articles sold in domestic market, in accordance with the ExportImport (EXIM) Policy and subject to other conditions specified by the Development Commissioner. Further, a subsequent Notification was issued which carried out amendments and substituting the charging clause of the inputs used in case of nonexcisable goods.
It was contended that amendment notification being retrospective in its application. Relying upon the CBEC Circular, the appellant contended that the Government intended to apply the notification retrospectively as it was brought in to address an anomaly, which existed vis a vis central excise notifications.
|GIB/DL/Union of India/05.05.2020/SC-20
|Union of India vs. Bharti Airtel Limited
|Rectification in GSTR-3B
|Fact & Issues Involved:
The petitioner for the period July 2017 to September 2017 claimed ITC in its Form GSTR 3B on estimated basis since details of actual ITC was not available to it. The exact ITC available for the relevant period was discovered only later in the month of October 2018, when the Government operationalized Form GSTR-2A for the past periods. The assessee challenged that these errors could have been avoided if the return filing process envisaged by GST Law would have operationalized on time. He further contended that the return filing system available in the law is drafted considering self-policing system, to avoid such errors. However, till date GSTR-2 and GSTR-3 could not be operationalized due to failed IT structure of GSTN. They emphasized the fact that the error in claiming in ITC was only due to the reason that the law has been partially implemented by the Government and the assessee could not get the clear picture of their claim of ITC on timely basis due to which they have to rely on the estimated figures till actual data was not available
|SUPREME COURT CORONA VIRUS (COVID-19)
|Issue & Fact of the Case:
Kerala HC and Allahabad HC, taking note of the prevailing 'precarious' scenario of "outburst of deadly corona virus", directed the Income tax authorities, authorities dealing with GST, erstwhile Kerala VAT, financial institutions, banks, etc. to defer the recovery proceedings or coercive measures till April 6, 2020. However citing far reaching consequences of the High Courts' orders, the Centre challenged the same before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court today stayed the orders passed by the High Courts of Kerala and Allahabad. Centre pleaded that there existed a mechanism for making online payment of taxes and there was no need for the High Courts to pass such an order, which effectively stops people from paying taxes. The petition filed by the Centre challenged the orders also on the grounds of violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. It contends that the High Courts exceeded their jurisdiction by passing orders through which recovery of taxes by various authorities stood deferred till April 6.
For Allahbad HC:- GIB/UP/DARPAN SAHU/18-03-2020/HC-78
For Kerala HC :- GIB/KR/KERALA HC COVID-19/16-03-2020/HC-79
|ADFERT TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD.
|Fact & Decision:
Hon'ble SC dismissed the SLP filed by department Tran 1 matters of Punjab and Haryana High Court decision in case of Adfert Technologies Pvt Ltd and others.
|GIB/WB/State of WB/03-10-2019/SC-15
|State of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Calcutta Club Ltd
|Issue of the case:
Appellant Calcutta Club Ltd. charged sales tax on food and beverages supplied to non-members or guests who accompany members, but not on supply of food and beverages to its members. The Revenue Authorities sought to tax the latter category also. The clubs argued that the supply of food and beverages to its members is a supply of goods and services to itself, and it was acting as an agent of its members.
The Revenue Authorities alleged that the doctrine of mutuality was not applicable after the amendment to Article 366(29-A), wherein a deeming fiction was created, holding that the supply of goods by clubs to its members will be treated as a sale for the purpose of levy of sales tax. It further argued that the doctrine of mutuality, as applicable to sales tax, was not applicable to service tax, after the introduction of negative list (in 2012) came into force.
|ALD Automotive Pvt. Ltd.
|Input Tax Credit
|Facts & Issue of The Case:
The appellant Ms. ALD Automobile Pvt. Ltd. Company is a registered dealer under Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006. It is engaged in the business of leasing and fleet management of the motor vehicles and resale of used motor vehicles and resale of used motor vehicles. The head office of the company is in Mumbai which negotiates the purchase price with the local registered in Tamil Nadu.
The appellant company issues the purchase order to the registered dealer along with the payment including the tax payable under the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006. The dealer also raises the tax invoice, the invoice of such purchases are received after a considerable delay as the original documents are sent to the Regional Transport Authority for registration of the vehicle.
The appellant had outsourced the job of collection of original tax to one M/s. MID Controls Private Limited, when the appellant had filed its returns for the assessment year 2007-08 for want of the said tax invoice, the said input tax credit could not be claimed. However they filed revise return but could not claim ITC. But the appellant was entitled to Claim ITC as per Section 19(2) of the Tamil Nadu VAT Act,2006. The appellant had filed a monthly return for the month of March, 2008 but there was delay in filing the return due to late receipt of original invoice, they revised the return in March 2009.
But as per the Section 19(11), if a dealer has not claim the ITC for a particular month, the same can be claimed before the end of the financial year or before 90 days from date of purchase, whichever is earlier.
|GIB/DL/COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS/30.07.2018/SC-22
|COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMSÂ (IMPORT)
|FACTS AND ISSUE OF THE CASE:
On 30 July 2018, the constitution bench of the Supreme Court of India (Court), in Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai (Appellant) v Dilip Kumar and Company & Ors. (Respondent) [Civil Appeal No. 3327 OF 2007], has pronounced the principles for the interpretation of exemption notifications in taxation statues.
The dispute concerned the classification of goods, namely Vitamin – E50 powder (feed grade) under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The Respondents contended that they were eligible for a concessional rate of duty under Notification No. 20/99-Cus dated 28 February 1999 (Notification) on the basis of the wider interpretation given to the description of goods specified therein. However, the Appellant was of the view that the concession claimed by the respondent was incorrect since the imported product in question was not covered under the Notification.
There were conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of taxation statutes and exemption notification in Sun Export Corporation, Bombay v Collector of Customs [(1997) 6 SCC 564] (Sun Export Case) and Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Guntur and Ors. v Surendra Cotton Oil Mills and Fertilizers Co. and Ors. [2001 (1) SCC 578] (Surendra Cotton Case). Therefore, it became necessary for a larger bench of the Court to review these conflicting judgements.
The Respondents relied on the judgment given by a three-judge bench of the Court in the Sun Export Case, wherein it was held that an exemption notification can be construed liberally. The Court observed that the decision rendered in the Sun Export Case was an outlier decision and in conflict with the correct position of law. As such, the Sun Export Case was overruled.
The Court went on to discuss the nuances of liberal and strict interpretations of an exemption notification. In this regard, the Court held that a strict interpretation should be accorded when the issue relates to eligibility of an exemption claimed by an assessee. The onus of proving this eligibility rests on the assessee. The Court further stated that once this threshold is crossed, and if an ambiguity persists, then a liberal interpretation in favour of the assessee should be adopted.
|The State Of Karnataka vs M/S M.K..Agro Tech.(P) Ltd.
|Input Tax Credit
|Facts & Issue Of The Case :
The respondent is a private limited company registered under the provisions of the KVAT Act and also under the provisions of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The assessee carried on business of manufacturing and trading of various kinds of edible oil. It purchases oiled sunflower cake as an input (pays input sales tax on that), extracts oil out of it in the solvent extraction plant, the oil is then refined in the refinery and trading is carried on through the trading unit. Indisputably the assessee also sells de-oiled cake which is a marketable good in itself.
The condition precedent for having the benefit of input tax deduction is that the goods sold or manufactured by the assessee should be liable to tax under the Act and if no output tax is payable then the question of deducting input tax in order to calculate the net tax would not arise. Here is a case where the respondent assessee has paid input tax while purchasing the raw material, namely, sunflower oil cake. This has been used for extraction of sunflower oil. Even after extracting the sunflower oil what remains is de-oiled cake which, no doubt, is a by-product. However, it is not to be discarded as waste.
|Southern Motors â€“vs-State of Karnataka
|Facts & Issue of The Case:
The appellant is a dealer in the motor vehicles and registered under the Act. Its version is that during the years in question i.e. 2007- 2008 and 2008-2009, it raised tax invoices on the purchasers as per the policy of manufacturers of vehicles to maintain uniformity in the price thereof.
The emphatic insistence on behalf of the appellant is that the combined reading of Section 30 and Rule 31 demonstrates in clear terms that the assesses are entitled to claim deduction of the discount allowed to their customers by credit notes, from the total turnover to quantify their taxable turnover.
The learned counsel have urged that as some discounts, especially those linked to targets to be achieved in a particular period are not comprehendable at the time of sale, these logically cannot be reflected in the tax invoices. They have maintained that such discounts actualize through credit notes at the end of the prescribed period for which the target is fixed and are thus governed by Section 30 of the Act and Rule 31 of the Rules.
|VATIKA TOWNSHIP PVT. LTD.
|Fact & Issues Involved:
In these batch of appeals, most of which are preferred by the Commissioner(s) of Income Tax (hereinafter referred to as 'the Department'), with the exception of few appeals filed by the assessees, the question of law which has fallen for consideration is as to whether the proviso appended to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which was inserted in that Section by the Finance Act, 2002 is to operate prospectively or is clarificatory and curative in nature and, therefore, has retrospective operation.
It so happened that this very issue about the said proviso to Section 113, viz., whether it is clarificatory and curative in nature and, therefore, can be applied retrospectively or it is to take effect from the date i.e. 01.06.2002 when it was inserted by the Finance Act, 2002, attracted the attention of this Court and was considered by the Division Bench in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Central II v. Suresh N. Gupta. The Division Bench held that the said proviso is clarificatory in nature.
|GIB/HR/Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd./15.05.2009/SC-27
|Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd.
|RATAN MELTING & WIRE INDUSTRIES
|Fact of the Case:
Learned counsel for the Union of India submitted that the law declared by this Court is supreme law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). The Circulars cannot be given primacy over the decisions.
Learned counsel for the assessee on the other hand submitted that once the circular has been issued it is binding on the revenue authorities and even if it runs counter to the decision of this Court, the revenue authorities cannot say that they are not bound by it. The circulars issued by the Board are not binding on the assessee but are binding on revenue authorities. It was submitted that once the Board issues a circular, the revenue authorities cannot take advantage of a decision of the Supreme Court. The consequences of issuing a circular are that the authorities cannot act contrary to the circular. Once the circular is brought to the notice of the Court, the challenge by the revenue should be turned out and the revenue cannot lodge an appeal taking the ground which is contrary to the circular.
Further, circulars and instructions issued by the Board are no doubt binding in law on the authorities under the respective statutes, but when the Supreme Court or the High Court declares the law on the question arising for consideration, it would not be appropriate for 4 the Court to direct that the circular should be given effect to and not the view expressed in a decision of this Court or the High Court
|Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd vs Union Of India And Anr
|Facts & Issue Of The Case
The appellant is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. Its registered office is at Mumbai. It obtained a loan from the Bhopal Branch of State Bank of India. This appeal arises out of the judgment passed by the High Court of Delhi, dismissing the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The appellant company, incorporated in Mumbai, was issued a notice by the respondent for repayment of the bank loan from Bhopal Branch in terms of the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. In pursuant to Article 226 of the Constitution, appellant filed a writ petition questioning the vires of the said act in High Court, Delhi. The petition was rejected on the ground that no cause of action arosed within territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, Delhi.
Issues Raised For Filing this Writ are-
Whether the seat of the Parliament or the Legislature of a State would be a relevant factor for determining the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Whether a writ petition to challenge of the seat of Parliament or Legislature can be entertained?
Whether a Writ Petition is maintainable without any Cause of Action?
It was submitted by the appellants that the writ filed before the High Court, Delhi is for questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act and had requisite jurisdiction to entertain the petition. But the respondent resisted the averment of appellant stating no cause of action arosed within the jurisdiction of High Court, Delhi.
|Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. vs Collector Of Central Excise
|Input Tax Credit
|Issue & Fact Of The Case -
The petitioners are mainly carrying on business activity of constructing shopping malls for the purpose of letting out of the same to numerous tenants. Huge Quantities of material and other inputs/ input services are required for construction purpose were purchased on which GST has been paid.
Whether the provisions restricting the credit of Input Tax as per Section 17(5)(d) is applicable to the petitioner company?
|Eicher Motors Ltd. And Anr vs Union Of India And Ors.
|Facts & Issue Of The Case :
As per the Case, credit facility which is made available could not be allowed to perpetuate and the entire Rule is in the form of a package and it makes it clear that there shall be no credit by rationalising the duty structure making it clear that addition of any input can be utilised up to a particular point of time. Prior to the 1995-96 Budget, the Central excise/additional duty of customs paid on inputs was allowed as credit for payment of excise duty on the final products, in the manufacture of which such inputs were used. The condition required for the same was that the credit of duty paid on inputs could have been used for discharge of duty/liability only in respect of those final products in manufacture of which such inputs were used. Thus it was claimed that there was a nexus between the inputs and the final products.
The stand of the assessees is that they have utilised the facility of paying excise duty on the inputs and carried the credit towards excise duty payable on the finished products. the assessee had already paid the taxes on the basis that when the goods are utilised in the manufacture of further products as inputs thereto then the tax on these goods gets adjusted which are finished subsequently. Thus a right accrued to the assessee on the date when they paid the tax on the raw materials or the inputs and right would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed.
|Indian Aluminum Co. Ltd AndAnr
|Facts & Issues of Cases:
Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. And Anr is the Respondent and manufactures aluminium products such as aluminium sheets, aluminium shapes, aluminium angles etc. out of aluminium ingots. In the process of manufacture, at the stage of processing, dross and skimmings arise and accumulate in the furnace in the shape of ashes as a result of oxidisation of metal. These ashes are formed mainly during the melting down of aluminium ingots and, to some extent, during subsequent treatment and holding operation of molten baths in the furnace.
Dross consists mostly of oxides, non-metallic material and other foreign material which separates or forms during melting and holding operations, and finally accumulates on the surface of the molten bath. It has to be removed. Skimmings are mostly thin oxide layers obtained by skimming a molten bath prior to metal transfer on casting. The skimming operation is essential to the manufacturing process. Dross and skimmings, according to the assessees, represent a process-loss or a melt- loss. Aluminium dross and skimmings contain a certain amount of metal from which they come. But they lack not only metal body but also metal strength, formability and character. Such dross and skimmings are, therefore, distinct from scrap which is a metal of as good a quality as the prime metal form which it arises.
All these appeals have been filed at the instance of the Union of India and the Collector of Central Excise. In all these appeals, the question of exigibility of such aluminium dross and skimmings to excise duty was raised.
The entire quantity of raw material, namely, duty-paid aluminium ingots procured by the assesses from outside was used in the manufacture of aluminium sheets. It is nobody’s case that the aluminium sheets which were manufactured by the assessees could have been manufactured out of a lesser quantity of aluminium ingots than what was actually used. In the process of manufacture, dross and skimmings had to be removed in order that aluminium sheets of the requisite quality could be manufactured. This does not mean that the entire quantity of aluminium ingots was not used for the manufacture of aluminium sheets. In the course of manufacture, a certain quantity of raw material may be lost because of the very nature of the process of manufacture or some small quantity of raw material may form part of wastage or ashes. This does not mean that the entire raw material was not used in the manufacture of finished excisable products. An exact mathematical equation between the quantity of raw material purchased and the raw material found in the finished product is not possible, and should not be looked for.
The ‘manufacturing loss’ forms part of the raw material ‘used’ in the manufacture though not reflected in the final product. The relief, as we understand the notification that has to be given to the manufacturer was in respect of the duty already paid on the raw material used in the manufacture of the final product. That is, the relief has to be given to the extent of the duty paid on the input material and not with reference to the quantity which ultimately forms part of the final product.”
|GIB/DL/Mangalore Chemicals /02-08-1991/SC-20
|Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited V. Deputy Commissioner
|In ‘Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited V. Deputy Commissioner’ – 1991 (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Case Number: No.- 3235 of 1991, Date of Judgement/Order: 02/08/1991
“it was held that the procedural infraction of Notification, Circulars etc., are to be condoned if exports have already taken place and the law is settled now that substantive benefit cannot be denied for procedural lapse.”
|UNION OF INDIA & ORS. VS. SOMASUNDRAM VISWANATH & ORS.
|Facts & Issue of the case:
Somasundram Viswanath was working as an officer in the Defence Accounts Service. Promotions to Level I & Level II of the Senior Administrative Grade of the said Service were governed by the Indian Defence Accounts Service (Recruitment) Rules. Under the Rules, recruitments by promotion to the senior administrative posts were to be made by Selection on merit on the recommendations of a duly constituted Departmental Promotion Committee.
When the case of the Respondent came within the Zone of consideration for promotion to the cadre of controller of Defence Accounts, the same was placed before the Departmental Promotion Committee, and the said Committee in order to make appropriate recommendations convened its meeting on 7.8.1986. At the said meeting one of its members i.e. the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence could not be present even though he was duly notified about the date and time of the meeting.
The 1st Respondent was graded good and was not put in the Select panel. Aggrieved by the said decision Respondent filed a Petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, challenging the validity of the recommendations made by the Department Promotion Committee and prayed for an order directing the appellant-union of India not to promote his juniors to the higher grade.
The principal contention raised by the Respondent before the Tribunal was that the Departmental Promotion Committee was not properly constituted, as one of its members, was absent with the result the proceedings of its meeting held on 7.8.1986 stood vitiated and recommendation made by it should not be acted upon.
On the other hand the Deptt. Contended that the proceedings of the Committee were protected by the administrative instructions issued by the Government of India with regard to the procedure to be followed by the D.P.C.
On consideration of the rival contentions the Central Administrative Tribunal came to the conclusion that the D.P.C. had not been properly constituted at the meeting held on 7.8.1986 because of the absence of the Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence and therefore the proceedings of the said Committee were not valid.
|GOVIND SARAN GANGA SARAN
|Fact & Issues Involved :
The appellant, used to purchase Cotton yarn and sell it to registered dealers, unregistered dealers and consumers. He submitted his return of turnover under the State Act for the assessment year 1968-69 and claimed exemption in respect of the turnover of sales of cotton thread on the ground that it was an exempted item under Entry 21 of the Second Schedule.
The Sales Tax Officer held that the sales were liable to tax as the same were affected in respect of cotton yarn. The appellant ultimately went in revision to the Financial Commissioner who proceeding on the basis that the sales were in respect of cotton yarn, which was a declared item under s.14 of the Central Sales Tax Act allowed the revision petition holding that they could not be subjected to sales tax because one of the conditions prescribed by s.15 of that Act had not been complied with, that is to say, the law had omitted to prescribe the single point at which the levy could alone be imposed.
Aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner, the Revenue filed a writ petition in the High Court which, relying on the construction placed by it on sub-clause (ii)of cl.(a) of s.5 in Fitwell Engineers Financial Commissioner Delhi Admn (1975) 35 S.T.C. 66, allowed the petition holding that the single point in a series of sales is the sale made by the last registered dealer among successive dealers when he sold the goods to an unauthorized dealer or consumer.
|B.C. SRINIVASA SETTY
|Fact & Issues Involved:
The assesses, a registered firm, manufactured and sold agarbattis. Clause (13) of the Instrument of Partnership executed on 28th of July, 1954 and subsequently extended by another instrument dated 31st March, 1964 showed that the goodwill of the firm had not been valued, and the valuation would be made on dissolution of the partnership.
The Commissioner, being of the view that the assessment order was prejudicial to the Revenue, decided to invoke his revisional jurisdiction and setting aside the assessment order directed the Income Tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after taking into account the capital gain arising on the sale of the goodwill. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in appeal accepted the contention of the assesses that the sale did not attract tax on capital gains under section 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The Income-Tax Officer made an assessment on the dissolved firm for the assessment year 1966-67 but did not include any amount on account of the gain arising on transfer of the goodwill. The Commissioner, being of the view that the assessment order was prejudicial to the Revenue, decided to invoke his revisional jurisdiction and setting aside the assessment order directed the Income-Tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after taking into account the capital gain arising on the sale of the goodwill.
The question in these appeals is whether the transfer of the goodwill of a newly commenced business can give rise to a capital gain taxable under s. 45, Income Tax Act, 1961.
|State of Tamil Nadu v. Binny Ltd. Madras
|Input Tax Credit
|Facts & Issues Involved:
The only question which arises for consideration in this Appeal by certificate is whether sales of provisions effected by the assessee in a workmen's store maintained by it are assessable to tax under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
The assessee carries on business of manufacture and sale of textiles in a factory situate in the State of Tamil Nadu. It is one of the leading manufacturers of textiles in the country. It is running a store in the premises of the factory where workmen can buy provisions.
In the course of assessment of the assessee to sates tax for the assessment year 1967-68 under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 the question arose whether the sales effected by the assessee in the store were taxable.
|ROYAL TALKIES, HYDERABAD AND ORS.
|Input Tax Credit
|Facts & Issues Involved:
Law is essentially the formal expression of the regulation of economic relations in society. That is the key note thought in this case, where the core question is : who is an employee ? Secondly, to decide the meaning of a welfare measure a feeling for the soul of the measure is a surer guide than meticulous dissection with lexical tools alone.
The Insurance Court found that the owners of theatres were principal employers with reference to the persons employed by contractors in the canteens and the cycle stands attached to the theatres and rejected the applications filed by the owners of theatres under Section 75 of the Act.
Merely being employed in connection with the work of an establishment, in itself, does not entitle a person to be an 'employee'. He must not only be employed in connection with the work of the establishment but also be shown to be employed in one or other of the three categories mentioned in Section 2(9).
|GIB/AHD/INSTALMENT SUPPLY LTD./01/05/1974/SC-28
|INSTALMENT SUPPLY LTD.
|State Of Tamil Nadu vs M/S Burmah Shell Oil Storage
|Input Tax Credit
|Facts & Issues Involved:
The respondents in these two appeals are Oil Companies and in C.A. No. 2119/69, the respondent under the Factories Act had to supply tea and edibles to its workmen for the Canteen established by it. It also supplied to its agents calenders, purses and key chains. Both the respondents also sell periodically as scraps, unserviceable oil drums, rubber hoses, jerry cans, rims etc.
In C.A. No. 2119/69, the respondent challenged the Sales Tax, levied under the Madras General Sales Tax Act 1959, in respect of advertisement materials, canteen sales, sale of scrap and the penalty.
It was contended before the High Court that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the Sales of publicity materials were chargeable to sales tax on the ground that (a) there was no sale at all by the assessee in the true sense-, and (b) even if there was, it was not as a dealer.